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ADAPTIVE REGULATION IN THE
AMORAL BAZAAR*
LAWRENCE G BAXTER†
Professor of the Practice of Law, Duke University
‘And who could heed the words of Charlie Darwin
Fighting for a system built to fail
Spooning water from their broken vessels
As far as I can see there is no land.’1
I INTRODUCTION
Oliver Deneys Schreiner was one of our greatest jurists and member of one
of South Africa’s most distinguished families. In South Africa’s remarkably
rich judicial history, he stands among her brightest luminaries. It is a singular
honour to be invited to speak to you this evening in his memory.
Justice Schreiner’s son was Vice Principal of my alma mater, the University
of Natal (now KwaZulu-Natal). And Justice Schreiner’s grandson, also
named Oliver, was a close friend. We were students together in England
when his own brilliant career was tragically cut short in March 1978.2
Recalling the triumphs and tragedies of this illustrious dynasty ﬁlls me with a
bittersweet mix of South African pride and sadness at the loss of what might
have been for young Oliver too. I am reminded of the opening words of the
poem Skoppensboer, penned by Justice Schreiner’s distant cousin, Eugène
Marais: ‘’n Druppel gal is in die soetste wyn’.
* Twelfth Oliver Schreiner Memorial Lecture, delivered on 20 October 2010 at
the Oliver Schreiner Building, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg. The kindness, encouragement and hospitality of my friends in South
Africa, particularly but by no means only Cora Hoexter and Laurence Boulle, have
been overwhelming. I am also very grateful for encouragement and advice from a
number of colleagues, including Jim Cox, Jed Purdy, Rebecca Dunning and
participants in Duke University’s Kenan Center on Ethics seminar group on
Rethinking Regulation. Jen Swearingen (Duke Law Class of 2011) and Frances
Eberhard (Duke LLM 2008) also provided helpful research assistance. None bears
any responsibility for my errors or failure to heed advice.
† BCom LLB (Natal) LLM Dip Leg Studs (Cantab) PhD (Natal).
1 ‘The low anthem, oh my god, Charlie Darwin’, track 01 (Charlie Darwin)
(2009).
2 See Ellison Kahn ‘Oliver Deneys Schreiner: A South African’ in Ellison Kahn
(ed) Fiat Iustitia: Essays in Memory of Oliver Deneys Schreiner (1983) 1 at 91.
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Yet South Africans are a people who insist on reaching beyond the
melancholy darkness brooding within Marais’ poem. Out of the stark agony
of apartheid emerges the poignant dignity of a blue plastic dress.3 South
Africa now holds up to the world a Constitution that presents itself as a bold
alternative to that oldest and perhaps most revered of constitutions, the
Constitution of the United States. The transformative Constitution embraces
a 21st century vision of human dignity richer and warmer than the 18th
century conception of liberty embodied in its American counterpart.
Contemporary public law scholarship and jurisprudence, emboldened by the
knowledge that judges and government leaders do now listen and care, are a
joy to read — sometimes almost as in a dream. When they can be heard
above the vuvezela symphony orchestra, SouthAfricans can boast proudly of
some of the world’s most revered leaders and statesmen.
So when I was invited to deliver this lecture, I wondered what I could
possibly say to you in the wake all this wondrous change. Given my own
long absence anything would surely seem presumptuous. Yet the interval
between my departure for the United States in 1985 and my lecture this
evening — the span of a full generation — has been a period of profound
change everywhere else too, and this passage of time provides an opportunity
to reﬂect upon the effects of some of these changes on the general theory of
administrative law and regulation. Many gradual changes in science, law and
society are crystallising to shape a signiﬁcant transformation in this ﬁeld.
Now the shocks and aftershocks of the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 make
this more visible. The doctrinal framework within which Judge Schreiner
himself attempted to modernise how law should regulate government and
private economic activity4 seems from our vantage point to be quite
antiquated.
In explaining why, my examples will come from the world of ﬁnancial
services, but they could easily be found anywhere in the arena of law and
regulation. First I will outline the basic premises of prevailing doctrine and its
growing shortcomings. Then I will describe developments in our under-
standing of the social ecologies through which law and regulation are
transfused. I will consider some of the implications for the way in which we
need to think about future regulation in order to be more effective in this
complex world. We are moving from a framework of directive regulation to
one that has to become much more adaptive.
3 The reference, of course, is to the depiction by Judith Mason in the South
African Constitutional Court, of the blue bags pitifully held together to preserve her
dignity by Phila Ndwandwe, murdered by the security police after being held naked
in solitary conﬁnement. See Albie Sachs The Strange Alchemy of Life and Law (2009)
vii–viii (preface by Judith Mason ‘The Man Who Sang and the Woman Who Kept
Silent’).
4 See the discussion by Cora Hoexter ‘Judicial policy revisited: Transformative
adjudication in administrative law’ (2008) 24 SAJHR 281 at 293 (discussing Schreiner
JA’s dissent in the infamous Mustapha v Receiver of Revenue, Lichtenburg 1958 (3) SA343
(A) at 347E-H).
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While my article will focus on understanding markets as evolutionary
social ecologies, and the consequences this has for administrative law and
regulation, it is also important that these ‘amoral bazaars’ be grounded on a
foundation of moral aspiration and integrity. I will therefore conclude with a
reminder that we ignore at our peril the urgent responsibility of
re-developing a moral framework within which markets should operate.
II ORTHODOXY
The broad theoretical underpinnings of modern administrative law rest on a
static, hierarchical model that has long captured our understanding of the
Rule of Law and the principle of legality in a democratic state.5 For lawyers,
the administrative governance of social and economic activities is to be
conducted under legislative authority that emanates from a democratically
elected legislature and executive. These organs of government are themselves
the creations of constitutions that have been accepted as politically legiti-
mate, and of rules, principles and doctrines developed symbiotically by courts
and jurists over many years.
In the modern age, where social transformation and protection of the
commons6 has required rapid, pro-active governmental action, the executive
departments and agencies of government have become dominant. Their
actions are nevertheless required under the principle of legality to be
authorised by properly delegated discretion. The courts, through the process
of judicial review, can then evaluate whether such authorisation has indeed
been provided.
Complementing this conception of democratic governance is a view of
human action that places great store by the capacity of men and women to
shape their domain. The audacious technological and economic achieve-
ments (and destructions) of the past two centuries have encouraged this view.
There has been a shift from Burkean conservativism to a belief that
government can be endowed, relatively safely, with enormous responsibili-
ties ranging from policing to public enterprise to highly complex industrial,
economic and social regulation. We have become bold in assuming we can
manage the unknown.
At the same time, battles for individual freedom, and the sheer apparent
success of capitalism as a generator of material wealth, have also encouraged a
taste for competition, free markets, and private enterprise. This we loosely
call free market capitalism. A central element of this ideology, ‘rational choice
theory’, has conceived economic man — homo economicus — as rational,
self-interested and value maximising.
5 See eg Cora Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 225–6 (laying out
the principles of lawfulness and legality that drive administrative law).
6 The classic study is Garrett Hardin ‘The tragedy of the commons’ (1968) 162
Science 1243. Nobel prizewinner Elinor Ostrom penned the leading monograph:
Elinor Ostrom Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(1990).
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The collective activity of such rational beings describes the essence of a
market; and their activity leads mysteriously, in the ‘invisible hand’metaphor
of Adam Smith,7 to efﬁcient results. Even though individual participants
might not have speciﬁcally intended such efﬁcient outcomes, we experience
and take them for granted every day. So in modern times we tend to express
our commitment to free markets by talking, not so much of ‘administration’,
but of ‘regulation’ — a concept that conveys the continuous ﬂow of the
market subject only to ‘tweaking’ by regulators or ‘administrators’. The
phrase ‘administrative law and regulation’ is common as an ideological hedge
for statists and free marketeers alike.
We have also seen the development of a highly sophisticated science of
economics. Economic models and metrics have been formulated one by one,
Nobel Prize by Nobel Prize, in the pursuit of a general theory of equilibrium
that might combine into one overarching view the theories of macro- and
micro-economics, value, and competition. Economic theory has increas-
ingly informed public policy and, in turn, the frameworks and techniques of
regulation. The wisdom of particular policies is routinely evaluated by
reference to the formal predictive and diagnostic models of economists.
Despite all this sophistication, the resulting framework remains a relatively
static and linear structure. It posits one-way direction of authority and
legitimacy. Policy is formulated using models that, although omitting
important real-world detail, appear to generate usable theories of prediction
and evaluation. The framework also presupposes an ability to proscribe
undesirable conduct in advance through rules and orders, to monitor
conduct under the prescriptive framework, to evaluate breaches by reference
to such rules and orders, to authorise private conduct or sanction breaches,
and to have the resulting government action tested in independent courts
and tribunals.
III CRACKS IN THE FRAMEWORK
Yet this static structure depends on many assumptions that are now known to
be simplistic or just plain wrong. It also ignores many other important
considerations. So we see symptoms of incoherence all around us.
It is not just neoclassical economics that stands on trial.8 To render
massively delegated government action more legitimate we have added
complicated and sometimes even convoluted rulemaking and adjudicative
processes that seem to beneﬁt only the lawyers and bureaucrats who manage
7 Adam Smith An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Glas-
gow ed 1776) vol 2a at 456.
8 For a sampling of the numerous attacks on traditional, equilibrium economics,
see eg John Quiggin Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us (2010);
John Cassidy ‘After the blowup: Laissez-faire economists do some soul searching’
New Yorker 11 January 2010; Paul Krugman ‘How did economists get it so wrong?’
New York Times 6 September 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/
magazine/06Economic-t.html.
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the process. Because we become frustrated at apparent incompetence and
corruption, we restructure and reinforce administrative agencies or simply
avoid the problem altogether by ‘deregulating’ in the hope that market
discipline alone will provide the necessary ordering. Judicial review is
sometimes an amorphous web of spongy principles in which judges are often
accused of meddling beyond their competence. Sanctions are formalised and
intensiﬁed in ever more complicated rules, yet these very rules provide still
new opportunities to evade the original purpose of the regulatory endeavour
altogether. At the same time, criminal and civil accountability, based on
simplistic juristic notions of personhood, have become so dispersed within a
labyrinth of private and public corporate complexity that the legal norms
barely operate as meaningful constraints at all.
What is happening, I would submit, is that our traditional approach is
breaking down in two related though different respects. Rational choice
theory, which drives so much of our approach to regulatory policy and
implementation, cannot stand alone as a basis for explaining how markets
operate, endure, and evolve.
We have also neglected the moral framework and aspirations that
ultimately shape market outcomes. The economic approach to understand-
ing markets has tended to draw us away from moral evaluation, leaving us to
focus on markets as no more than great, amoral bazaars. Yet many avoidable
recent catastrophes remind us that we have been mistaken to treat markets as
morally neutral arrangements for promoting economic efﬁciency.
Allow me to address each of these issues in turn.
IV COMPLEXITY
First, I wish to consider the complexity of markets.
The limitations of traditional regulation became most evident during the
global ﬁnancial crisis. Enormously complex rules and regulations, supposedly
enforced by armies of regulators in many countries and facilitated through
ever more esoteric modeling of risks, failed miserably to anticipate, let alone
prevent or even mitigate, a ﬁnancial collapse. Similar dysfunction is evident
in many other areas of domestic and international governance, where reports
of market and regulatory failures are often front-page news. These gloomy
results occur, not because we have become collectively stupid. Rather,
markets have become too complex to manage and regulate effectively by
relying on traditional techniques alone.
Powerful intellectual traditions have indeed warned us of the boundaries
of our knowledge. The mystery of markets, the common law, and customary
legal traditions, have inspired jurisprudential theories from Adam Smith and
Karl von Savigny to Oliver Wendell Holmes and Friedrich Hayek. Even as
they celebrated custom, markets and common law, they warned of the
limitations on our collective capacity to know and respond to the future and
to engage in large scale social engineering.
We have, however, the ability to become much more scientiﬁc about our
understanding of collective action. I cannot resist mentioning one South
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African pioneer whose contribution, in happier circumstances, might have
received much greater recognition. This was Eugène Marais, lawyer, poet,
and entomologist. Marais is well known to South Africans but he is not
always fully appreciated. His greatest passion culminated in a study he
entitled The Soul of the White Ant,9 in which he depicted what he called the
‘psychological life’ of termite communities. At school I was taught that
Marais was a great poet but his work on the natural world was only an
eccentric curiosity. Yet in many ways Marais’ studies were an extension of the
work of Charles Darwin. His work on ant colonies, tragically plagiarised10
and still largely unacknowledged, has now become a model for the
application of modern science to business leadership and strategy.11 I like to
think that Justice Schreiner, who was actually related to Eugène Marais,12
and who had a Holmesian view of the common law,13 might have been
sympathetic to Marais’ views.
Technology now drives the study of collective or communal activity far
beyond the level pioneered by scientists such as Marais. In the span of a
generation, the information-acquiring and knowledge-generating infra-
structure has exploded. Networks for accessing and sharing information have
grown to the point where the Earth is enmeshed on the ground, underwater
and in near space by dense webs providing huge data transmission capability.
Data storage capacity has escalated beyond wildest dreams. The computer
processing power to process this data into usable information continues to
double every eighteen to twenty-four months.14
9 Eugène N Marais Die Siel van die Mier (1937) (The Soul of the White Ant. English
translation byWinifred de Kok (2009)).
10 Marais was the victim of wholesale plagiarism of his ideas and work by the
Belgian Nobel prizewinner, Maurice Maeterlinck, whose fame and supposed scien-
tiﬁc honesty misled the world into thinking that it was the thief and not the scientist
who had done the work. Marais ended his own long and troubled life in despair. See
LeonRousseau The Dark Stream: The Story of Eugène N Marais (1982) 522–8.
11 In a cruel twist of fateMarais does not appear to be acknowledged in themodern
literature on complexity theory applying his ant colony model. See Deborah M
Gordon Ant Encounters: Interaction Networks and Colony Behavior (2010) 2 (crediting
Maeterlink with continuing the earlier work of the French naturalist, Réaumur, but
not mentioning Marais); Richard T Pascale, Mark Millemann & Linda Gioja Surfing
the Edge of Chaos: The Laws of Nature and the New Laws of Business (2000); Margaret J
Wheatley Leadership and the New Science: Learning about Organization from an Orderly
Universe (1992) 4n6 (citing naturalists and popular writer, Richard Conniff, but not
Marais). See the article by Richard Conniff ‘The enemy within’ 1998 Smithsonian
Magazine 82.
12 See P M Nienaber & Ellison Kahn (eds) ‘Regter P M Nienaber in gesprek met
Regter Leo van den Heever en haar eggenoot, Chris Neethling, op 13 Januarie 2000
te Kaapstad’ (2004) 121 SALJ 1 at 5nn4 and 5 (describing the complex relationships
between the Findlay,Marais and Schreiner families).
13 See Kahn op cit note 2 at 67–8, 69 (describing Schreiner’s ‘Holmesian’ view of
the common law, which, with the ‘life of the law’ being ‘experience, not logic’, ﬁts
well with the evolutionary notion of common law as a complex adaptive system).
14 This rate of growth is known as ‘Moore’s Law’ after Gordon E Moore,
co-founder of Intel Corporation, who in 1965 originally projected the doubling of
computing power every year for another ten years. In a 1975 paper entitled ‘Progress
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A result is that theories, once mere hypotheses, can be tested more quickly
and thoroughly than ever before. Previously irreconcilable datasets can be
linked to provide the basis for synthetic predictions. Regressions can be run
and repeatedly reformulated so that the same data can be processed for widely
different purposes. Complex models can be correlated to produce entirely
new knowledge. We have learned to exploit incredibly rich repositories of
natural, human and artiﬁcially synthesised data. Whole new disciplines, once
fanciful before these very recent technology developments, have been
spawned.15
The interdisciplinary framework for such studies is complexity science,
which seeks to indentify complex patterns amid apparently chaotic systems.16
This new framework draws from a range of disciplines and is now the
organising principle for some prestigious research centres.17 Results are
becoming evident across the social sciences, including archaeology,18 eco-
nomics,19 sociology20 and law.21 We are beginning to understand previously
in digital integrated electronics’ (available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?
arnumber=1478174&tag=1) Moore revised his projection to expect doubling every
24 months. A Caltech professor, Carver Mead, coined the term ‘Moore’s Law’.
Recent reports indicate that the supposed atomic limits to Moore’s law continue to
be circumvented by new science. See eg John Markoff ‘Computers as invisible as the
air’New York Times 4 September 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/
05/weekinreview/05markoff.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=Moore’s%20Law&st=cse.
15 Illustrations of the new ability to mine huge databases in order to develop whole
new bodies of useful knowledge (for good and ill) are to be found in the popular book
by IanAyres Supercrunchers: Why Thinking-by-Numbers is the Way to be Smart (2007).
16 Complexity theory should be distinguished from its sister discipline, chaos
theory, in that complexity theory seeks to identify patterns of order within apparent
chaos, whereas chaos theory studies randomness. A splendid map to the various ele-
ments of complexity studies is depicted in a wikipedia graphic at http://
upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/5/5a/Complexity-map-overview.png.
17 See eg the Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico (http://www.santafe.edu/); the
Center for the Study of Complex Systems in Michigan (http://www.cscs.umich.edu/);
and ETHZurich in Switzerland (http://www.ethz.ch/index_EN).
18 See eg JosephATainter The Collapse of Complex Societies (1988), esp ch 2.
19 The seminal article is by W BrianArthur ‘Complexity and the economy’ (1999)
284 Science 107. For a historical review, see David Colander ‘Complexity and the
history of economic thought’ (March 2008) Middlebury College Economics Discus-
sion Paper No 08–04; ‘The complexity revolution in economics’ in J Barkley Rosser,
Richard P F Holt & David Colander (eds) European Economics at a Crossroads (2010)
29–39. See also Richard S Whitt & Stephen J Schultz ‘The new ‘‘emergence eco-
nomics’’ of innovation and growth and what it means for communications policy’
(2009) 7 J Telecommunications & High Technology 217.
20 See eg Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley ‘Regulating or redesigning ﬁnance?
Market architectures, normal accidents, and dilemmas of regulatory reform’ (2010)
30ARes Soc Org 281.
21 A host of law review articles on the application of complexity theory to various
aspects of the law has already appeared. For a general survey, see J B Ruhl ‘Law’s
complexity: A primer’ (2008) 24 Georgia State University LR 885. See also the excel-
lent recent overview on the applicability of complexity theory to global governance
by MarkAChinen ‘Governing complexity’ in Laurence Boulle (ed) Globalisation and
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inscrutable phenomena in the environment, markets, societies, communi-
ties, and legal systems.
The new language of complexity has even entered the popular media. Its
terminology has been absorbed, sometimes unwittingly, into mainstream
academic writing. It is common to hear historians speak of ‘path dependen-
cy’22 and ‘emergence’,23 while military24 and business25 strategists advocate
‘sense and respond’ techniques, lawyers talk of ‘networks’26 and ‘fragmenta-
tion nodes’,27 and investment bankers speak of ‘Black Swans’, ‘convexity’
and ‘robustness’.28 Lawyers, economists, sociologists and even physicists,
peering through the lenses of their diverse disciplines, all focus on the events
Governance (2011) 55. Scholars such as Jenna Bednar of Michigan University have
been doing extensive research on law and legal institutions using complexity meth-
ods. See her research page at http://www-personal.umich.edu/jbednar/research.html. My
own description of international ﬁnancial regulation as a complex system is ‘Interna-
tionalisation of law — the ‘‘complex″ case of bank regulation’ in Mary Hiscock
& William van Caenegem (eds) The Internationalisation of Law: Legislating, Decision-
Making, Practice and Education (2010) 3.
22 Onwhich, see Scott E Page ‘Path dependence’2006 Quarterly J Pol Sc 87.
23 See eg Eric D Beinhocker The Origin of Wealth: The Radical Remaking of Econom-
ics and what it Means for Business and Society (2006); Mary O Furner ‘From ‘‘state
interference’’ to the ‘‘return to the market’’: The rhetoric of economic regulation
from the old gilded age to the new’ in Edward J Balleisen & David A Moss (eds)
Government and Markets: Toward a New Theory of Regulation (2010) 92 at 93. The
Scottish historian, Niall Ferguson, is in the author’s view one of the best historian-
prognosticators; his method is very clearly rooted in complexity theory. See eg Niall
Ferguson ‘Sinking globalization’ (Mar/April 2005) 84:2 Foreign Affairs 64; ‘Complex-
ity and collapse’ (Mar/April 2010) 89:2 Foreign Affairs 17.
24 See eg David J Kilcullen ‘Countering global insurgency’ (2005) 28 J Strat Stud
597 (approaching the war against Al Qa’ida from a complexity perspective); Ashley
Leonczyk ‘Peacekeeping and counterinsurgency: How US military doctrine can
improve peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic Of the Congo’ (2010) 204 Mili-
tary LR 66 (describing the impact of The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency
Field Manual (2007)). See also Vicente Valle ‘Chaos, complexity and deterrence’paper
prepared at the National War College (1970), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/
awc/awcgate/ndu/valle.pdf).
25 See eg Pascale et al op cit note 11; Margaret J Wheatley Leadership and the New
Science: Learning about Organization from an Orderly Universe (1992).
26 See eg Richard S Whitt ‘Adaptive policymaking: Evolving and applying emer-
gent solutions for U.S. communications policy’ (2009) 61 Fed Comm LJ.
27 See eg Kathryn Judge ‘Fragmentation nodes: A study in ﬁnancial innovation,
complexity and risk’ unpublished working paper on ﬁle with the author. The
complexity-sociological perspective describes derivatives, for example, as ‘nodes of
networks of social relations, products that link assets, asset holders, claims, obligations,
and income ﬂows in remarkably complex and evolving systems of interdependence
with their own as yet poorly understood emergent properties’. See Schneiberg &
Bartley op cit note 20 at 287.
28 Nassim Nicholas Taleb The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable
(2007). The revised edition (2010) at 305ff contains a lengthy exegesis on ‘robust-
ness’. See also Nicholas Nassim Taleb ‘Convexity, robustness, and model error inside
the ‘‘Black Swan domain’’ ’, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1669317).
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL260
JOBNAME: SALJ11 Part2 PAGE: 9 SESS: 3 OUTPUT: Sat Jun 25 15:29:30 2011
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2011−Part2/01article
of the global ﬁnancial crisis and speak of ‘systemic risk’,29 ‘extreme intercon-
nectedness’30 and ‘tight coupling’.31 Indeed, a substantial literature applying
complexity theory to the general subject of administrative law and regulation
itself is already developing.32
Before exploring some of the implications for administrative law and
regulation, let us ﬁrst consider the central characteristics of complex
systems.33 A complex adaptive system is one in which ‘large networks of
components with no central control and simple rules of operation give rise to complex
behavior, sophisticated information processing, and adaptation via learning or evolu-
tion’.34 Such systems are self-organising and they possess a number of features
that interact dynamically in diverse, often unpredictable ways.
The basic frames of reference of complex systems are themselves subject to
constant change: such systems rest on what were elegantly labeled ‘dancing
landscapes’,35 which make such systems not merely complicated but inherently
complex.36 Landscapes dance yet the ecologies that depend upon them can
become robust because they are diverse, connected, interdependent and
adaptive.37 If these elements interact in just the right balance, there emerges a
living ecology that, while continuing to evolve and adapt, manages to
maintain a systemic equilibrium.
29 See eg Steven L Schwarcz ‘Systemic risk’ (2009) 97 Geo LJ 193 and ‘Regulating
complexity in ﬁnancial markets’ (2010) 87 Washington Univ LR 211.
30 See eg Randall Kroszner ‘Interconnectedness, fragility and the ﬁnancial crisis’,
testimony to the Financial Crisis Forum, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (26
February 2010), available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010–0226-Kroszner.
pdf; ‘Lost robustness’ in Naissance 8 at 9 (ETH Newsletter, April 2008, available at
http://www1.ethz.ch/ccss/news/LostRobustness.pdf).
31 See Schneiberg &Bartley op cit note 20 at 283.
32 See eg J BRuhl ‘General design principles for resilience and adaptive capacity in
legal systems:Applications to climate change adaptation law’ (2011) 89 North Carolina
LR (forthcoming); Donald T Hornstein ‘Complexity theory, adaptation, and admin-
istrative law’ (2005) 54 Duke LJ 913; J B Ruhl ‘Regulation by adaptive management:
Is it possible?’ (2005) 7 Minn J L Sci & Tech 21; J B Ruhl & James Salzman ‘Mozart and
the Red Queen: The problem of regulatory accretion and the administrative state’
(2003) 91 Geo LJ 757. I have made an attempt to apply the complexity view to
international ﬁnancial regulation in my chapter in Hiscock &Van Caenegem (eds) op
cit note 21.
33 Very useful summaries have been provided by the European scientists Dirk
Helbing ‘Managing complexity in socio-economic systems’ (2009) 17 Eur Rev 423
and Dirk Helbing & Stefan Lämmer ‘Managing complexity: An introduction’ in D
Helbing (ed) Managing Complexity: Insights, Concepts, Applications (2008) 1.
34 Melanie Mitchell Complexity: A Guided Tour (2009) 13. Ruhl op cit note 32
provides a very nice analysis of complexity and adaptive capacity within the speciﬁc
context of (environmental) regulation.
35 StuartAKauffman The Origins of Order: Self Organization and Selection in Evolution
(1993) 243–4.
36 John H Miller & Scott E Page Complex Adaptive Systems: An Introduction to
Computational Models of Social Life (2007) 9–10.
37 See ibid, esp ch 2.
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Even when seemingly stable, complex systems are also not necessarily
‘rational’; rather, they tend to be ‘path dependent’. This means that a current
state of affairs can only be explained by tracing the (frequently non-linear)
development from the past. Complex systems also tend to live precariously
on the ‘edges of chaos’.38 They can encounter precipitous change from
unexpected, initially benign sources, or because a slight change can trigger
powerful new forces.
Chaos generated from seemingly benign sources is called the ‘butterﬂy
effect’39 because it is theoretically possible (there being no other butterﬂies!)
for the small ﬂapping of the butterﬂy’s wings to cause ripples that ultimately
might change the path of a tornado.40 Sudden dramatic change might also
occur, not so much because of the cumulative effect of a small initial change,
but because of newly combined forces called ‘power laws’. Power laws
generate exponential effects that are entirely unexpected departures from the
‘normal’ developments one might otherwise have expected.41
Ominous edges of chaos are alarmingly evident in the ﬁnancial world.
Systemic risk42 has of course become an almost household term after the
global ﬁnancial crisis was triggered by the bankruptcy ﬁling of Lehman
Brothers on 15 September 2008. Nor is such hazard conﬁned to the
occurrence of grand events like the unexpected failures of a very large
ﬁnancial institution. Let me illustrate with two examples, one only a few
months old and another occurring right now.
The ﬁrst is the so-called ‘Flash Crash’of 6 May 2010.43 Sudden collapses in
trading prices quickly spread from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to the
38 Archaeologists, describing why a society can suddenly collapse despite being
made up of independently stable elements, use the term ‘decomposition’, and for
them such systems are ‘nearly decomposable’. SeeTainter op cit note 18 at 23.
39 Edward Lorenz, a scientist working on long-range weather forecasting,
famously depicted the phenomenon in an accidental computer simulation in the
1960s. He discovered the dramatically variable effects a computer simulation would
have if redirected by minute changes in the initial data. Edward N Lorenz ‘Determin-
istic nonperiodic ﬂow’(1963) 20 J Atmos Sc 130.
40 The idea, already expressed in speculative terms long before Lorenz, took hold
of the imagination of the popular culture and, though largely misunderstood, mani-
fests itself in bad movies such as The Butterfly Effect in 2004. See Peter Dizikes ‘The
meaning of the butterﬂy: Why pop culture loves the ‘‘butterﬂy effect’’ and gets it
totally wrong’ Boston Globe 8 June 2008, available at http://www.boston.com/
bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2008/06/08/the_meaning_of_the_butterfly/.
41 The prominent role sheer randomness plays in our lives and inmarkets, and how
we try to discern regular patterns that are often nonexistence has been developed in at
least two best sellers: Nassim Nicholas Taleb Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of
Chance in Life and in the Markets 2 ed (2004) and Leonard Molodinow The Drunkard’s
Walk: How Randomness Rules Our Lives (2008).
42 See Dirk Helbing Systemic Risks in Society and Economics. Working Paper for the
Santa Fe Institute, 18 November 2009, available at http://www.futurict.ethz.ch/data/
pubs/CCSS_new.pdf). See also Iman Anabtawi & Steven L Schwarz Regulating Sys-
temic Risk (2010).
43 Report of the Staffs of the CFTC and Secretary to the Joint Advisory Committee on
Emerging Regulatory Issues: Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 2010 30
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New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq. The Dow Jones dropped dramati-
cally (by 3.2 per cent) in a matter of minutes. Prices of some stocks oscillated
wildly. Accenture, one of the major global consulting ﬁrms, saw the price of
its stock plunge from $40 to 1 cent! The prices of other stocks soared from
pennies to over $100 000! Trading had to be suspended in order to stabilise
the markets. We have subsequently learned that the cause was a computer-
trading algorithm used by a single trader to sell futures contracts. Once this
programme generated transactions it triggered a chain reaction that could be
stopped only by halting trading.44
The second example is occurring at the moment. It might only be a scary
aftershock of the American subprime crisis that will just dampen economic
recovery, or it could be much worse: another global ﬁnancial crisis in the
making. I speak of the so-called ‘foreclosure crisis’ in the United States.45 The
courts have stopped foreclosures involving hundreds of thousands of homes
because the documents preparing for foreclosure were not properly pro-
cessed. It turns out that they were executed en masse by ‘robo-signers’ who
merely rubber-stamped the huge volume of ﬁles passing through their
ofﬁces. So banks are being required to repurchase mortgages they had sold
and reassign their value to the books. In the view of some the impact might
become catastrophic because some of the world’s largest banks are implicated
very severely.46 One might consider this the effect of power laws: imperfect
title and collateral, compounded by the extremely complex web of
mortgage-backed securities and collateralised debt obligations, are creating
September 2010, available at http://financialservices.house.gov/FinancialSvcsDemMedia/
file/key_issues/StaffFindingsregardingtheEventsofMay6.pdf.
44 For a fascinating, minute-by-minute display of how this crash took place, see the
graphic accompanying the Wall Street Journal article by Kara Scannell ‘Report:Algo-
rithm set off ‘‘ﬂash crash’’ amid stressed market’ Wall Street Journal, 1 October 2010,
available at http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703859204575
525973854203534.html?mod=djemalertNEWS&mg=reno-secaucus-wsj#articleTabs%
3Darticle; and http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703859204575
525973854203534.html?mod=djemalertNEWS&mg=reno-secaucus-wsj#articleTabs%
3Dinteractive. See also Graham Bowley ‘Lone $4.1 billion sale led to ‘‘ﬂash crash’’ in
May’ New York Times, 1 October 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
10/02/business/02flash.html?_r=1; and the charts provided by Courtney Comstock
‘The ‘‘WhoCaused the Flash CrashReport’’by the SEC’Bus Insider, 1 October 2010,
available at http://www.businessinsider.com/the-flash-crash-report-is-out-heres-what-you-
need-to-know–2010–10?utm.
45 See generally Susan Kapner ‘Wells adds to crisis over home seizures’ Fin Times,
14 October 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ed4aa856-d70b–11df–9cd5–
00144feabdc0.html; Nick Timeraos & Carrick Mollenkamp ‘Document mess hits
Fannie, Freddy’ Wall Street Journal, 14 October 2010, available at http://
professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704763904575550472268902454.
html?mod=wsjproe_hps_LEFTWhatsNews.
46 See eg Gregory White ‘Is Bank Of America the most exposed if there’s a brand
new mortgage-bond scandal?’ Bus Insider, 13 October 2010, available at http://
www.businessinsider.com/manal-mehta-branch-hill-capital-bac–2010–10 (referring to a
doomsday scenario analysis of Bank of America).
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havoc throughout the ﬁnancial market. None of this was anticipated three
months ago.
When not plunged into the abyss of chaos, the evolution of complex
systems leads to an ‘emergence’ of conditions or states that are not simply the
product of their input: the sum is greater than the parts. Just as the ‘wetness’of
water is not merely the accumulation of molecules of H2O, and ‘mind’ is not
merely a collection of brain tissue and neurons, markets are not merely the
sum of the actions of market participants, and the ‘common law’ is not just an
aggregation of judicial rulings. To use Adam Smith’s metaphor, it is as if an
‘invisible hand’ leads us to a transcendent result. Complexity science seeks to
demystify this process.
Viewing markets in this way is not just a theoretical game: complex
systems are the product of ‘bottom up’ activity, not ‘intelligent design’. The
reorientation in thinking is as dramatic as the contrast between creationist
and Darwinian science. A ‘market’, once it is understood to be a complex
ecology, embraces not only the activities of market participants but also those
of regulators, judges, elected officials, and observers and has to account for the
reflexive interactivity between all of them.
V ADAPTIVE REGULATION
This forces us to look at public and private market activity more broadly. The
constant, mutual interaction of the participants, or ‘agents’ as they are called,
powers the dynamics of an evolving ecology. It does not seem realistic to
expect that we can merely establish rules and authority for the purpose of
‘commanding’ desired outcomes. For every ‘command’ there is likely to be a
corresponding reaction that creates yet a new situation to which the
‘commander’must react. One-way direction becomes ineffective.
Here is a current example: the transnational body known as the Basel
Committee has been working on improving the regulatory framework for
banks around the world. It has just announced the approval of rules designed
to strengthen the capital resilience of banks. This proposed regime is known
as ‘Basel III’. Yet even before the new rules have been ﬁnalised by the G20,47
those who will be subject to them — the banks — are with some notable
exceptions,48 busily ﬁguring out how the rules can be gamed.49 Probably no
47 Formal approval occured at the Seoul meeting of the G20 inNovember 2010.
48 See the views of new Barclays CEO, John Varley, who believes that the new
capital requirements of Basel III and their implementation timetable are fair, a view
described as ‘particularly surprising’. Patrick Jenkins ‘Barclays chief praises ‘‘sub-
stance’’of Basel’Financial Times, 17 October 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/
s/0/6140eabc-da28–11df-bdd7–00144feabdc0.html. Barclays is majority owner of
SouthAfrica’sABSA.
49 For a current example of ‘gaming’, see eg John Plender ‘Basel III is priming the
big banks to work the system’Financial Times, 21 September 2010, available at http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/37bf1f4e-c59a–11df-ab48–00144feab49a.html. Exactly the same
arbitraging behaviour took place in anticipation of the earlier, Basel II, rules. See eg
Adrian Blundell-Wignall, PaulAtkinson & Se Hoon Lee ‘The current ﬁnancial crisis:
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rule could be written that can prevent this. Regulatory ecologies are
inherently in a constant state of ﬂux and regulators have to adapt to the
endless unfurling of change. This in turn requires the focus of regulators to
move from direction to adaptation.
What might such an adaptive approach to regulation look like?
Many of the emerging themes will not be surprising because they would
be familiar to sophisticated administrative lawyers, judges and regulators.
Viewing these themes together, however, perhaps requires us to change the
basic orientation from which we would think about the administrative state
and its regulation.
Here are a few examples.
First is a deep understanding of the structure and dynamics of the market
to be regulated. This involves identifying and monitoring the basic condi-
tions for market resilience and its system dynamics.50 The variables will
determine which regulatory tools to use and adapt in order to promote
continued stability and manage what Keynes called our ‘animal spirits’.51
Examples of such tools ranging from competition rules to self-regulation,
absolute prohibitions to experimental variation, are common.
A recent example illustrates the way in which regulators have begun to
learn from the dynamics of markets. In attempting to improve the ability of
ﬁnancial institutions to withstand sudden market shocks, particularly in times
of generalised panic, ﬁnancial regulators have been developing the concept
of ‘countercyclical regulation’. As adaptive regulators they are attempting to
learn to recognise when a ﬁnancial system gains precipitous momentum so
that they can move to counteract that momentum and perhaps reduce the
possibility of a plunge into chaos.52
Regulators and administrative lawyers might also ﬁnd it helpful to reﬁne
our understanding of the conditions in which markets emerge through a kind
of self-generation. Sociologists use the term autopoiesis.53 Despite the exotic
Causes and policy issues’ (2008) 6/7 OECD Financial Market Trends (ISSN 1995–
2864, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/26/41942872.pdf) describing
how Citibank, along with many other banks, anticipated the new capital rules and
adjusted their business to require lower capital.
50 For an extensive analysis of the concept of resilience and its application and
utility to regulation, seeRuhl op cit n 32.
51 John Maynard Keynes The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
(1936: BN Publisher’s ed, 2008) 161; George A Akerlof & Robert J Shiller Animal
Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why it Matters for Global Capi-
talism (2010).
52 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Regulatory Frame-
work for Banks (Basel III 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm.
53 Autopoiesis, a concept imported from the biological sciences by the German
sociologist, Niklas Lumann, addresses the self-producing character of law and legal
systems and the ways in which other sub-systems, such as the economic and political,
communicate across systemic boundaries. See Niklas Luhman Law as a Social System
(translated by Klaus A Ziegert, Fatima Kastner et al) (2004); Guenther Teubner (ed)
Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society. See also Colin Scott ‘Regulation
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name, the autopoiesis of legal systems has, in traditional legal theory, been
widely taken for granted as a condition of advanced legal systems. The
validity of evolving elements of the law, such as the common law, tends to be
explained by reference to preconditions for the validity of legal norms:
sources of law are assessed for their validity by secondary laws, for example.54
So too, the legal frameworks of markets are often assumed to be stable
enough to be self-referential. Knowing when and how a self-sustaining
market emerges would help us understand the degree to which regulation
should be graduated in consonance with the need to promote resilience and
stability.
Another growing ﬁeld of knowledge is network dynamics.55 Open and
ever-expanding networks are shaping the behaviour of both market partici-
pants and regulatory communities. Terrorists and international money
launderers exploit the power of networking; so too does the growing
international collaboration by regulators. From network theory we learn
both the enormous capability of market agents when appropriately net-
worked and the limitations on what humans can meaningfully monitor and
manage, which is important for risk management and its regulation.
Network theory thus becomes central to regulatory understanding and risk
management. Insights from the sciences provide unexpected applications for
regulation. George Miller’s ‘magical number seven’, which suggests severe
judgement and memory limitations on the amount of information that we
are able to receive, process, and remember,56 and ‘Dunbar’s number’, which
posits that the size of the cerebral cortex imposes a constraint on the
maximum number of social relationships we can meaningfully manage,57
both suggest limitations on the scope of our ability to manage complex
enterprises and the risks they generate. Furthermore, it is not effective to
in the age of governance: The rise of the post-regulatory state’ in Jacint Jordana &
David Levi-Faur (eds)The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for
the Age of Governance (2004) 145, 150–4; J B Ruhl ‘Complexity theory as a paradigm
for the dynamical law-and-society system: Awake-up call for legal reductionism and
the modern state’ (1996) 45 Duke LJ 849 at 901–2 (distinguishing the ‘open’ approach
of complexity theory from the ‘‘reductionism’’ to which theorists deploying auto-
poiesis tend to resort).
54 H LAHart The Concept of Law (1961).
55 For extensive research on networks, see the Duke Network Analysis Center
(DNAC) at http://econ.duke.edu/people/kranton/networks, and the Centre for Com-
plex Network Research (CCNR) at http://barabasilab.com. See also the 2010 Ulam
lecture, ‘The connected world’, given by Mark Newman at the Santa Fe Institute, 14
September 2010, available at http://www.santafe.edu/research/videos/play/?id=
be501a2f-cc0c-4fb2-b2ea–2994cf1e2320.
56 GeorgeAMiller ‘The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on
our capacity for processing information’ (1956) 63 Psych Rev 81 (reproduced with
permission online at http://www.musanim.com/miller1956/).
57 See R I M Dunbar ‘Neocortex size as a constraint on group size in primates’
(1992) 22 J Human Evolution 469. Both Miller’s and Dunbar’s work have been popu-
larised in the best seller byMalcolmGladwell The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can
Make a Big Difference (2000) at 175–81.
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charge regulators with managing networks beyond their own ‘networking’
capabilities; so it might be that we can discern some optimal points of scale
for regulatory agencies. Sometimes — counter-intuitively — multiple
regulators might even be better than fewer, consolidated ones if
co-ordination problems can be overcome.
Moving from the way in which market agents are connected to how they
actually behave, we are acquiring increasing insight from the behavioural
sciences. Unlike observers of complexity in the natural world, regulators of
social and economic markets must take into account the fact that humans are
strategic agents: they ‘game’ their interactions with others; and they prize
identity and roles. Work on game theory58 and identity economics59 casts
more light on market activity than does rational choice theory and helps to
predict such things as second- and third-order consequences and what might
motivate people beyond pure ﬁnancial compensation.
Indeed, behavioural science is driving a stake through the heart of our
assumption that our actions are based on rational choices. It turns out that we
are actually ‘predictably irrational’.60 We make decisions that are very often
driven by interests and impulses we either do not recognise or we did not
think might be the motive for acting. And when we act in groups the
problem becomes even worse:61 we swarm, free load and act directly
contrary to our interests much more than we like to think. This new
knowledge helps us understand the irrational behaviour that seems to
generate economic bubbles,62 behaviour that in 1720 led Sir Isaac Newton,
after he had lost a fortune speculating in the stock of the famed South Sea
Company, to lament that he could ‘calculate the motions of the heavenly
bodies, but not the madness of people’.63
Innovation is also an important phenomenon in any adaptive market. The
ﬁnancial crisis has been blamed partly on the innovation of dangerous new
products. Yet innovation is also highly valued in competitive markets. So
regulators must deepen their insights into the factors that generate or drive
innovation, both good and bad, and recognise that prohibiting an activity can
just as surely generate innovation, either desirable or destructive, as permit-
ting it.
58 SeeRobertAxelrod The Evolution of Cooperation (rev ed 2006).
59 George AAkerlof & Rachelle E Kranton Identity Economics: How Our Identities
Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being (2010).
60 Dan Ariely Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape Our Decisions
(2008). See also the delightful elaboration on this theme by David Segal ‘The X
Factor of economics: people’ New York Times Week in Review, 16 October 2010,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/weekinreview/17segal.html.
61 See eg Mancur Olsen The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups (1971).
62 See Gary Stix ‘The science of bubbles’Scientific American, 22 June 2009, available
at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=the-science-of-economic-bubbles.
63 Quoted in Charles P Kindleberger & Robert Z Aliber Manias, Panics, and
Crashes: A History of Financial Crises 5 ed (2005) 47.
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Viewing a market ecology as a whole, we also cannot ignore the dynamics
of the regulators involved. The regulators are, after all, agents in the market
themselves. For more than four decades the debate over regulation has
focused on which is worse, ‘market failure’ or ‘regulatory failure’. Yet these
concepts are interdependent: tackling difﬁcult issues such as ‘regulatory
capture’, for example, requires more than just taking sides: very often
regulators are not ‘captive’ but rather reactive agents just responding to
buffeting forces of conﬂicting interests. Polar extremes, such as ‘regulation’or
‘deregulation’, ‘government-regulation’ or ‘self-regulation’, though repre-
senting ends on spectrums, are sometimes not sensible as mutually exclusive
or binary options: markets seldom, if ever, faithfully track one to the
exclusion of the other.
There are many other examples of the impact an adaptive approach would
have on traditional regulation. I will mention only one more because it has
intriguing implications for general jurisprudence as well. This is the fact that
the legal framework from which authorisation of administrative action is
drawn might be more complex than our traditional models suggest. We are
used in jurisprudence to identifying the validity of rules by reference to
so-called secondary rules that determine their pedigree. Yet the ‘authorisa-
tion’ to act and react with ‘governmental’ force ‘seeps’ continuously from
many sources, some of which are highly visible and formal, such as legislation
and regulations, and some of which are the product of separate power bases
such as locally-elected councils or other organised groups that have an
interest in imposing structure and regularity.64 I call this ‘multipollency’ to
indicate the various fonts of political authority underlying legality.
One important source is judges themselves. Consider how important
multipollency has become in South Africa where it is now the explicit duty
of judges to engage in ‘transformative constitutionalism’. Cora Hoexter has
described this new set of options for judges as ‘an entirely new bargain’ struck
under the Constitution.65 So a full understanding of when and how
regulators can act requires a more dynamic or complex approach to questions
of legality.
64 At the grand constitutional level, every elected tier of government draws from
the very fact of its election some authority that cannot realistically be described as
‘delegated’ from a central power. In the world of international ﬁnancial regulation, on
the other hand, ‘transnational regulatory networks’ such as the G20, the Financial
Stability Board, and the Basel Committee provide structure without politically
coherent authority. We cannot ignore the fact that such ‘governmental’ centres of
power have a de facto authority that ultimately translates into real legal impact on
agents within the global ﬁnancial ecology— and that such agents inﬂuence these very
governmental agents (for better or worse) themselves. So we need a science of ‘polity
dynamics’, which would help us understand the ways in which variegated political
authority mobilises, informs and validates market activity.
65 Hoexter op cit note 4 at 284.
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VI MORALITY FOR THE AMORAL BAZAAR
Allow me to turn now from the complexity of markets and their regulation
to the importance of an overarching moral framework. No matter how
sophisticated we become in understanding the various dimensions of
regulated markets, we cannot ignore the moral values these markets are
informed by and ultimately reﬂect.
To view the market as amoral, in the sense that each agent will be operating
from his or her own moral perspective and not necessarily on some shared
moral code, can sometimes help us see more clearly what incentives are at
stake. Moral perspectives are only some of the many factors shaping
emergent conditions.
Yet one of the most important regulatory mechanisms of all — indeed the
glue that holds markets together — is a sense of mutual understanding among
the participants and the critical self-regulation this induces. And mutual
understanding endures only on the basis of a deep and widespread commit-
ment to moral integrity within a market. So even though it has lately been
unfashionable to focus on market morality and ethics, we ignore the moral
dimension at our peril.
The modern economic conceptualisation of markets as ‘amoral’ has an
ironic provenance. Those who would disparage the predictive capabilities of
economists famously mock economics as a ‘dismal science’. But the label was
originally coined to depict a science devoid of any moral core. It was Thomas
Carlyle who, in 1849, ﬁrst labeled economics a ‘dismal science’. He was an
apologist for slavery, espousing an idealised notion of a society in which slaves
would be happy if kept in their ‘proper place’. He despised economics
because, in his view, theories of ‘ ‘‘supply-and-demand’’ and reduc[ing] the
duty of human governors to that of letting men alone’ lacked moral principle.
He took the ‘amoral’ arguments of great economists such as John Stuart Mill
to be something ‘abject and distressing’.66
Around the same time the 19th Century economist, Francis Edgeworth,
began to emphasise that, as a discipline for scientiﬁc economic analysis, the
‘ﬁrst principle’ of economics is that self-interest is the primary motivator of
‘every agent’.67 Amoral utilitarianism became the sole measure of the
wisdom of economic constraints. Later extremes in rational choice theory
created the impression and perhaps even promoted an entire cultural
disposition that market values should not be driven by moral values. Even
now we read strictly ‘amoral’ defences of the behaviour of market partici-
pants during the subprime bubble that led to the Global Financial Crisis.68
66 See David Levy ‘150 years and still dismal! Thomas Carlyle’s problem with
economics was its opposition to racial slavery’ (2000) 50:3 The Freeman, available at
http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/150-years-and-still-dismal/#.
67 SeeAmartya Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 184 (discussing Edgeworth).
68 See eg Robert T Miller ‘Morals in a market bubble’ (2009) 35 Univ Dayton LR
113. Cf Arnold Kling ‘The ﬁnancial crisis: Moral failure or cognitive failure?’ (2010)
33 Harv J L & Pub Policy 507.
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Such ‘clear-eyed’ logic bereft of moral compass is coming under attack by
those who believe the ﬁnancial crash reﬂects as much a deﬁciency in moral
character as miscalculations of supposedly rational market participants.69
Indeed, in criticising economists, Carlyle had apparently overlooked the fact
that morality had deeply informed the views of economists from ancient
times. It should be remembered that well before Carlyle’s time the founder of
modern economics, Adam Smith, had published not only his famous Wealth
of Nations70 but also the Theory of Moral Sentiments.71 In Moral Sentiments
Smith displayed great concern for human welfare and the importance of a
global moral framework for any successful economy.72 He never confused
‘self interest’ with the ‘selﬁshness’ of our latter day Wall Street anti-hero,
Gordon Gekko.73 On the contrary, Smith could hardly have been clearer
about the connection between morality and prosperity:
‘[R]eal and solid professional abilities, joined to prudent, just, ﬁrm, and
temperate conduct, can very seldom fail of success . . . success . . . almost always
depends upon the favor and good opinion of . . . neighbors . . . we may
generally expect a considerable degree of virtue; . . . .’74
Yet Smith is constantly invoked by those who would assert that moral
principle is only marginal to market analysis.AsAmartya Sen has put it,Adam
Smith ‘has had much smallness thrust upon him’!
Sen and others,75 including complexity theorists,76 have recommenced
the difﬁcult task of working out how a coherent moral framework for
complex markets might be articulated. This is a new moral jurisprudence that
is essential to the orderly functioning of markets. Economic law does in fact
rest on many deep traditions of moral principle upon which stable markets
have long depended. Obvious examples include obligations of ﬁduciary
duty, insurable interest, good faith and honest dealing.
69 See Kevin T Jackson ‘The scandal beneath the ﬁnancial crisis: Getting a view
from amoral-cultural mental model’ (2010) 33 Harv J L & Pub Policy 735.
70 Smith op cit note 7.
71 Adam Smith A Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759).
72 See Sen op cit note 67 at 185–6;Amartya Sen ‘Capitalism beyond the crisis’New
York Review of Books, 26 March 2009, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
archives/2009/mar/26/capitalism-beyond-the-crisis/.
73 Sen op cit note 67 at 186. See also Gavin Kennedy ‘Adam Smith and the
invisible hand: From metaphor to myth’ (2009) 6 Econ J Watch 239. Gordon Gekko is
the leading character (Michael Douglas) in the movie Wall Street (1987), famous for
asserting that ‘[g]reed, for lack of a better word, is good’.
74 Smith op cit note 71 I.iii.3.5 at 63. See also VII.ii.4.13 at 312–13, rejecting Dr
Mandeville’s ‘favourite conclusion, that private vices are public beneﬁts’.
75 See eg Kling op cit note 68; Jackson op cit note 69.
76 Complexity theorists have indeed begun work on trying to link the dynamics of
markets to the public values we can require regulators to promote. See Chinen
‘Governing Complexity’op cit note 21 at 55. Professor Chinen suggests a fruitful link
between economic analysis, complexity theory and public morality, and cites to Iris
H-Y Chiu ‘Enhancing responsibility in ﬁnancial regulation — Critically examining
the future of public-private governance’ (2010) 4 Law & Fin Markets Rev 170 (part I);
and 4 Law & Fin Markets Rev 286 (part II).
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Doctrinal conceptualism sometimes stands in the way and enables rogue
agents to engage in arbitrage, avoiding legal accountability by exploiting
doctrinal limitations in existing jurisprudence.77 Personal responsibility, for
example, has become too diluted in modern commercial law. Insights from
complexity science and speciﬁc social sciences such as criminology suggest
rethinking principles of corporate criminal liability so that personal account-
ability, and therefore real accountability for corporate decisions, might be
restored to the markets.78
VII CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by acknowledging that the exciting possibilities for adaptive
regulation in markets are not without their dangers.
There is understandable skepticism about any ‘new’ science, no matter
how deep its antecedents, because its efﬁcacy is not proven by long
experience, its disciplines are not fully developed, and because it threatens
the high priests of orthodoxy. In America recently a physicist at the Santa Fe
Institute, the nation’s leading center for complexity studies, wanted to apply
complexity methods by using advanced computing power to map human
economic behaviour in ways similar to how weather and climate change is
tracked. He was initially denied funding by the National Science Foundation
when lower-level neoclassical economists opposed the proposal because it
did not ﬁt their requirement that such models tend to general equilibrium.
The physicist received his grant only after a sympathetic higher-level ofﬁcer
overruled the objections.79
77 As always, Niall Ferguson brings astute historical insight to bear in observing
that: ‘The real lesson of history is that regulation alone is not the key to ﬁnancial
stability. Indeed, over-complicated regulation can be the disease it purports to cure,
by encouraging a culture of box-ticking ‘‘compliance’’ rather than individual moral
judgment. The question that gets asked in highly regulated markets is not: ‘‘Are we
doing the right thing?’’but ‘‘Canwe get awaywith this?’’What is more important is to
instill in ﬁnancial professionals framework that was the basis of Siegmund Warburg’s
life and work. ‘‘Success from the ﬁnancial and from the prestige point of view .. . is
not enough’’, Warburg told his fellow directors in 1959. ‘‘What matters even more is
constructive achievement and adherence to high moral standards in the way in which
we do our work.’’.’
Niall Ferguson ‘To do ‘‘God’s work,’’ bankers need morals’, available at http://
www.niallferguson.com/site/FERG/Templates/ArticleItem.aspx?pageid=234. Ferguson is
the biographer of the great ﬁnancier. See Niall Ferguson High Financier: The Lives and
Time of Siegmund Warburg (2010).
78 See eg the work being done by Bill Black: William K Black ‘When fragile
becomes friable: Endemic control fraud as a cause of economic stagnation and col-
lapse’ in K Naga Srivalli (ed) White Collar Crimes: a Debate (2007) 162–78; ‘ ‘‘Control
frauds’’ as ﬁnancial super-predators: How ‘‘pathogens’’make ﬁnancial markets inefﬁ-
cient’ (2005) 34 J Socio-Econ 734 and ‘Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission’, 21 September 2010, available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/
2010–0921-William-Black.pdf.
79 Michael Hirsh ‘Our best minds are failing us:WithAmerica in deep trouble, our
economists are AWOL, and our scientists are still off ‘‘ﬁnancial engineering’’ ’ News-
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The overall discipline is indeed new and methodologically immature. So
the principles of cautious development that Justice Schreiner urged when
addressing the common law80 and its development by the courts remain as
apposite as ever.
Some of the intellectual contributions over the past century and a half have
also become associated with discredited policies, programmes and beliefs. It is
easy to conclude that a population approach to markets implies ‘survival of
the ﬁttest’ and, even worse, some kind of eugenics.81 Modern science is
demonstrating why these conclusions are simply wrong. An objection might
be heard that to embrace Hayek’s or Von Savigny’s understanding of the
evolution of law and policy would entail also embracing Hayek’s rejection of
government regulation as a dangerous threat to freedom, or Savigny’s
volksgeist as later distorted by the Nazis. There are dangerous connotations
to many of the breakthroughs in scientiﬁc understanding, but they occur
when the science is abandoned and ideology is substituted instead. This
counsels rigorous adherence to the scientiﬁc basis for regulatory policies.
Last, but equally important, while understanding markets to be ‘amoral’
for analytical purposes is sometimes probative, this should not lead us to
neglect the moral dimensions of both markets and regulatory policy. Markets
cannot long survive without moral precepts. Recent events have seen a sad
shortage of ethical behaviour and a considerable degree of hubris. Former
Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve System Alan Greenspan
famously described the mood as one of ‘irrational exuberance’, though even
he failed to understand the complex implications at the time. We are
reminded that we would do well to remember that orderly markets also
depend on the kind of humility, self-restraint and rectitude that made Judge
Schreiner the great jurist he was.82
week, 16 September 2010, available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/09/16/ our-
best-economic-minds-are-failing-us.
80 See Kahn op cit note 2 at 67–9, describing Schreiner’s ‘Holmesian’ view of the
common law, which, with the ‘life of the law’ being ‘experience, not logic’, ﬁts well
with the evolutionary notion of common law as a complex adaptive system.
81 Cf J Wes Ulm ‘Cachet of the cutthroat’ (2010) 16 Democracy 58, available at
http://democracyjournal.org/article.php?ID=6740, describing the damaging impacts of
‘social Darwinism’.
82 See Kahn op cit note 2 at 22, describing the time Justice Schreiner refused to
pull rank or permit a trafﬁc policeman to discard a ticket that was about to be written
up for Schreiner’s speeding, even though the Justice felt that the speed limit in that
area was unfair.
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